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 A Microeconometric Analysis of Risk Aversion
 and the Decision to Self-insure
 Charles J. Cicchetti
 Arthur Andersen Economic Consulting
 Jeffrey A. Dubin
 California Institute of Technology
 This study estimates a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
 using market data and microeconometric methods. We investigate
 the decision whether to purchase insurance against the risk of tele-
 phone line trouble in the home. Using the choices of approximately
 10,000 residential customers, we determine the shape of the utility
 function and the degree of risk aversion. We find that risk aversion
 varies systematically in the population and varies with the level of
 income and that the observed choice behavior is consistent with ex-
 pected utility maximization.
 I. Introduction
 Whether expected utility theory is consistent with individual behavior
 is a question that has received considerable attention by economists,
 marketing scientists, and psychologists. The growing body of evi-
 dence, derived principally from laboratory experiments (Mosteller
 and Nogee 1951; Grether and Plott 1979), suggests that expected
 utility theory is frequently violated. Limitations of expected utility
 theory have led to the development of many alternative theories such
 We thank Chris Pleatsikas and Kristina Sepetys for research assistance and David
 Grether, Louis Wilde, and seminar participants at the University of Southern Califor-
 nia Department of Decision Systems for their helpful comments. We also thank the
 referee, who provided very detailed and helpful comments.
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 as prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and many others
 (see, e.g., Camerer [1994] for a comprehensive survey). While tests
 of consistency of the various theories with observed behavior have
 begun (see, e.g., Camerer 1989; Camerer and Kunreuther 1989; Cur-
 rim and Sarin 1989), the conclusion of much of this analysis is that
 "no theory can explain all of the data, but prospect theory and the
 hypothesis that indifference curves fan out can explain most of them"
 (Camerer 1989, p. 61).
 There are at least two reasons why the demise of expected utility
 theory may be premature. First, it has been observed that individual
 experiments and market experiments often produce dissimilar re-
 sults. While laboratory experiments have shown that individuals may
 poorly estimate probabilities and violate the basic axioms of probabil-
 ity theory, experimental results in market settings have been more
 encouraging (see, e.g., Brookshire et al. 1985). Second, the majority
 of existing studies avoid the direct estimation of the individual's utility
 or value function. However, by avoiding the direct estimation of the
 utility function, researchers have ignored the potential for individual
 response error and for randomness or heterogeneity in preferences.
 The purpose of the present analysis is to address both of these
 concerns by estimating a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
 using market data and microeconometric methods. The empirical
 analysis we conduct is based on the decision whether to purchase
 insurance or to self-insure against the risk of telephone line trouble
 in the home. Using the choices of approximately 10,000 residential
 customers, we determine the shape of the utility function and the
 degree of risk preference. Our model for the choice of firm insurance
 versus self-insurance is based on expected utility theory and random
 utility maximization. We allow for both state-dependent and status
 quo effects in the estimation and test for local departures from ex-
 pected utility theory by allowing the subjective probability of line
 trouble to differ from the actual probability.
 Our empirical analysis is most similar to that of Viscusi and Evans
 (1990) and Evans and Viscusi (1991) but relies on market rather than
 contingent valuation data. First, we use first- and second-order Taylor
 series expansions of the difference in utility states to examine the
 local properties of the underlying utility function, that is, whether
 insurance is an inferior good and whether consumers, in fact, reveal
 risk aversion. We then use a full information maximum likelihood
 (FIML) procedure to estimate a fully parameterized structural model.
 Our results indicate that (1) risk aversion varies systematically in the
 population and varies with the level of income, (2) observed choice
 behavior is consistent with expected utility theory, and (3) overweight-
 ing of low-probability events is not present in this context.
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 In Section II we discuss the basic inside-wire maintenance (IWM)
 contract, which allows a consumer to insure against potential tele-
 phone line trouble. In Section III we examine several theories behind
 the purchase of IWM contracts including service, insurance, and pri-
 ority service aspects. In Section IV we develop a theory of IWM
 choice based on expected utility theory and discrete choice economet-
 rics. Section V describes the data we use in the estimation, and Section
 VI develops both the reduced-form and the structural-form esti-
 mates. We present conclusions in Section VII.
 II. IWM Contracts
 Inside-wire maintenance service contracts were created as a result of
 the deregulation of the telephone industry. Before 1982, when the
 telephone industry was forced to unbundle many of its traditional
 service arrangements such as the installation and repair of telephones
 and the inside wiring for telephones, all customers with basic tele-
 phone exchange service were charged a monthly fee that recovered
 installation and maintenance costs. The single monthly charge paid
 by customers did not separate charges paid for maintenance or for
 installation. After the 1982 Federal Communications Commission di-
 vestiture order, regional phone companies were required to termi-
 nate many services such as phone repair and make optional some
 other services such as maintenance of inside home wiring. Phone
 customers could contract with the phone company to acquire IWM,
 they could hire a third party to do the work when it became necessary,
 or they could do it themselves.
 In some parts of the country, customers were "negatively enrolled"
 in IWM programs. Negative enrollment occurred when customers
 were notified (typically by a phone bill insert) that they would auto-
 matically be charged for basic IWM service unless they specifically
 notified the telephone company they did not want the maintenance
 contract.' But many customers were not negatively enrolled in the
 post-1982 period. Customers who initiated new phone service (per-
 haps by moving into or within the service region or by adding new
 service) had the opportunity to choose from a variety of service fea-
 tures including IWM. We use a sample of individuals whose choices
 regarding IWM were nonpassive to reveal the preferences of the
 population at large.
 1 The negative enrollment aspect of IWM has brought challenges legally on the basis
 that many customers did not select and would not have selected IWM contracts had
 they been nonpassively enrolled. See, e.g., Sollenberger et al. v. Mountain States Tele-
 phone and Telegraph Co., Civil Action no. 87-1485-SC, 121 F.R.D. 417; U.S. Dist.
 LEXIS 13538 (August 12, 1988), decided.
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 As we discuss below, our data come from the Mountain States Tele-
 phone and Telegraph Company (U.S. West) service area. During the
 1980s, Mountain Bell customers faced a monthly probability of line
 trouble of less than 0.5 percent. The mean time to failure for line
 trouble was thus about 17 years. Typical charges for IWM were ap-
 proximately $0.45 per month. When line trouble would occur, repair
 charges averaged about $55. Therefore, the expected cost of line
 trouble was about $0.262 per month. Mountain Bell customers there-
 fore paid, on average, an amount greater than was actuarially fair.
 Yet the market penetration of IWM among actively enrolled custom-
 ers was eventually well above 50 percent. In the next section we con-
 sider several theories (including risk aversion) that help explain the
 purchase behavior of IWM.
 III. Theories of Purchase Behavior
 for IWM Contracts
 The inside-wire maintenance contract between customers and the
 phone company has elements of several different commodities. We
 discuss three potentially important elements: (1) IWM as a service
 contract, (2) IWM as insurance, and (3) IWM as priority service.
 A. Service Contracts
 The literature on service contracts (see, e.g., Day and Fox 1985; Fox
 and Day 1988) indicates that service contracts are typically expensive
 compared with the protection they provide; the expected cost of re-
 pair varies between 25 and 50 percent of the cost of the contract.
 Renewals for service contracts are typically low because of the low
 frequency of contact between the consumer and the organization of-
 fering the contract. Also, individuals with relatively little experience
 with a product class are more likely to obtain service contracts. Some
 features of IWM-including high renewal frequency, low renewal
 cost, and substantial product awareness-may make it more success-
 ful in gaining and keeping customers. These features tend to make
 the firm-insured state more desirable than the self-insured state.2
 B. Insurance
 Inside-wire maintenance contracts are insurance policies that fully
 cover the cost of replacement or repair of the phone equipment if it
 2 For a full discussion of these issues and aspects of IWM contracts as warranties,
 see Cicchetti and Dubin (1992).
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 fails. Customers cannot adopt to partially insure against the hazard of
 line failure so that the amount of insurance purchased is not relevant.
 Instead consumers must make a discrete decision whether to firm-
 insure or to self-insure. Empirical evidence on insurance purchases
 is largely laboratory experimental. Hershey and Schoemaker (1980)
 found, for instance, that individuals overweight low-probability
 events. Shogren (1990), also using experimental data, found evidence
 to support Hershey and Schoemaker. He too found that individuals
 overestimate the impact of low probabilities, but that the degree of
 overestimation decreased with repeated market exposure.3
 C. Priority Service
 Inside-wire maintenance also shares some aspects of priority service.
 Individuals who require service reliability or guaranteed access to the
 phone system may be willing to pay more for IWM contracts. But
 priority service offers gradations of service reliability to customers
 whereas inside-wire contracts offer no gradations at all, merely a
 method of dealing with service outages once they occur. If there is a
 perception on the part of customers that having an IWM contract
 reduces outage costs, then there may be a preference for IWM con-
 tracts.
 Our theory of IWM contract choice most closely follows the discrete
 insurance model. To the extent that other motivations are present
 (status quo effects, certainty effects, priority effects, etc.), we general-
 ize the expected utility theory model by allowing state dependence in
 the utility function, unobserved random preference, and the possibil-
 ity for subjective and actual probabilities to differ.4 These issues are
 taken up below when we operationalize a structural model for IWM
 purchase.
 IV. A Theory of IWM Choice
 Customers who choose inside-wire maintenance replace the uncertain
 possibility of having to pay for inside-wire repair (both the direct
 3 The recent theoretical literature on the demand for insurance is concerned with
 whether insurance is a Giffen good; this literature asserts that insurance purchases are
 inferior (Borch 1986; Briys, Dionne, and Eeckhoudt 1989). But these studies do not
 cite evidence for this widely accepted view. The theoretical model of Szpiro (1985) is
 most applicable to IWM because in his model only full coverage is possible. Our situa-
 tion is also similar to that of Dreze (1981), who shows that the degree of absolute risk
 aversion can be inferred from the amount of insurance purchased, the distribution of
 losses, the probability of loss, and the level of wealth.
 4 Hartman, Doane, and Woo (1991) identify a strong preference for the status quo.
 In many cases customers must be compensated for switching reliability regimes even
 when the alternative entails more reliable service than they already receive.
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 charges for repair and the indirect costs of finding a repair service)
 with a guaranty of not having to bear the cost of repair at the expense
 of a fixed monthly fee. Risk aversion and differing levels of income
 in the customer class lead some individuals to prefer firm insurance
 to the alternative of self-insurance. In this section we develop a theory
 of IWM choice and consider how properties of the utility function
 can be inferred from a population of nonidentical consumers who
 reveal their preferences by their choices.
 We begin with a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U(W)
 that is increasing in wealth, U'(W) > 0. Let C denote the cost of
 repair for the uninsured individual, R the monthly fee for IWM, and
 p the exogenous probability of line trouble. The utility with insurance
 is U(W - R). The expected utility under self-insurance is pU(W
 - C) + (1 - p) U(W). Individuals will insure provided that the utility
 with insurance exceeds the expected utility under self-insurance. In
 the population, individuals are heterogeneous, and not all compo-
 nents of utility are observable. We account for these differences em-
 pirically through three sources: (1) differing levels of risk aversion,
 (2) differing levels of income, and (3) alternative specific preferences.
 Specifically, we specify a utility function U(W; s, i, E), where s repre-
 sents characteristics of the decision maker, i the state in which utility
 occurs (insured or self-insured), and E a random component of indi-
 rect utility.
 To generate a specific probabilistic choice system for observed
 choices, we follow McFadden (1981) and assume random utility max-
 imization with additively separable random errors.5 We therefore
 write the indirect utility function as
 U(V; s, i,) = U(V; s, i) + i- (1)
 Under the hypothesis of random utility maximization, the individ-
 ual chooses to insure provided that
 U(W -R;s,i,El)?pU(W - C;s,2,E2) + (1 -p)U(W;s,2,E2) (2)
 or
 U(W - R; s, 1) + El ' [pU(W - C; s, 2) + (1 - p) U(W; s, 2)] + E2. (3)
 If we further assume that the Ej are independent extreme-value
 distributed (McFadden 1974), then the probability associated with the
 5 Our development of a random utility model for choice of IWM contract shares
 elements in common with both Eliashberg and Hauser (1985) and Laskey and Fischer
 (1987). Since our model assumes random utility maximization, it shares the error
 structure of Laskey and Fischer. But we interpret the randomness as Eliashberg and
 Hauser do-as unobserved effects known to the individual but unknown to the econo-
 metrician-rather than as response errors.
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.153 on Wed, 30 Aug 2017 20:42:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 RISK AVERSION 175
 event in equation (3) is given by
 q = probability that individual buys insurance
 _ 1 (4)
 1 + eAV,
 where
 AV = U(W - R; s, 1) - [pU(W - C; s, 2) + (1 - p) U(W; s, 2)]. (5)
 The probability of purchasing IWM depends on the indirect utility
 difference AV, which is a function of the individual's wealth level W,
 the costs R and C, the probability of having line trouble p, and the
 degree of risk aversion as embodied in the function U. Intuitively,
 we can determine the degree of risk aversion from the level of market
 preference for insurance. However, risk aversion need not be the
 only explanation for why individuals in aggregate prefer insurance
 to self-insurance. If, for example, the degree of absolute risk aversion
 declines in income, then the amount, R*, an individual would be
 willing to pay to avoid a fixed-size gamble declines as income in-
 creases; that is, if R'(W) < 0, then dR*IdW ' 0. A proof of this result
 is provided by Mossin (1968), or one can easily verify that convexity
 of the function f(p) = U'(W - R*(p)) - [pU'(W - C) + (1 -
 p)U'(W)] in the interval p E [0, 1] is sufficient for dR*IdW ' 0.
 Knowing whether R* declines as income increases is not sufficient
 to determine whether AV will decrease; although AV = U(W - R)
 - U(W - R*), the income level W is increasing at the same time as
 R* is declining. Is there a set of conditions under which discrete
 insurance purchases are inferior? To answer this question, we exam-
 ine aAV/aW. From equation (5),
 aAV= U(W - R) - [pU'(W - C) + (1 - p)U'(W)]
 aw ~ ~ ~~~~d*(6)
 = [U'(W - R) - U'(W - R*)] + U'(W - R*) dW
 When the individual's maximum willingness to pay R* is greater
 than the market cost of discrete insurance R, U'(W - R*) >
 U'(W - R) as long as utility is strictly concave. Since the first term
 in equation (6) is negative, a sufficient condition for aAVI/W ' 0 is
 that dR*IdW ' 0. But this is only a sufficient condition, and it is
 possible for aAVIaW ' 0 when dR*IdW is close to zero. When the
 individual's maximum willingness to pay R* is less than the market
 cost R, the first term in equation (6) is positive and it is necessary that
 dR*IdW be negative (and sufficiently so) in order that aAVI/W < 0.
 The analysis above demonstrates that an empirical observation of
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 discrete insurance purchases as inferior does not limit a priori the
 class of admissible utility functions. This observation notwithstanding,
 a family of utility functions that allows nonconstant absolute risk aver-
 sion may be a good candidate for structural estimation when it is
 reasonably assured that the individual's willingness to pay exceeds
 the market price.
 V. Description of the Data
 Our analysis is based on a random sample of 25,099 observations of
 residential customers in the Mountain Bell Colorado service area.
 The sample was taken from customer records in July 1990. Mountain
 Bell maintains records of its customers for the purposes of billing and
 telemarketing. Billing records contain information on the presence of
 or lack of various service options and the size of the monthly bill. We
 use the billing records to define two variables. First, any household
 that subscribes to an IWM program and pays a monthly service
 charge for this option is assigned a value of one using the indicator
 variable (IWM). All other households are assigned a value of zero.
 Second, we define a typical monthly bill (BILL), which is equal to the
 average amount paid by the household for service and tolls (including
 the amounts paid for special service features such as IWM, call wait-
 ing, and the like).
 Mountain Bell maintains 24 variables for each customer matched
 either from company records or from census data. In the case of
 monthly income, a categorical variable matched at the block group/
 enumeration district level is the basis for our continuous variable
 (MINC). We also use information from company records to deter-
 mine when a customer initiated telephone service. Customers with
 phone service prior to March 1982 were passively enrolled in basic
 IWM service, whereas subscribers who started phone service after
 March 1982 were actively enrolled. To include only households that
 actively decided about the IWM option, we restrict the sample to
 those households that began service after March 1982. This elimi-
 nates a total of 9,663 households from the analysis.6 We have also
 defined a dummy variable (POST86) to indicate whether a household
 initiated phone service after or prior to 1986. This variable is used
 to capture differences in the types of IWM service options available
 during the period 1982-90. Prior to 1986, Mountain Bell offered
 6 We have further eliminated from the sample any individuals who are employees
 of the phone company and receive service at no charge (148 households), and have
 also eliminated households for which data are missing (4,644 households). After these
 deletions, our analysis sample consists of 10,644 households.
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 TABLE 1
 SAMPLE STATISTICS AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS (N = 10,644)
 Standard
 Name Description Mean Min Max Deviation
 IWM Inside-wire mainte- .571 .0 1.0 .495
 nance
 MINC Monthly income 1.6994 .3125 6.2500 .6138
 ($ thousands)
 BILL Monthly bill ($) 25.30 5.0 100.0 10.42
 TPROB Trouble probability .00477 .00318 .00742 .00093
 POST86 Service acquired .687 .0 1.0 .463
 after 1986
 only a basic inside-wire service contract. In 1986, Mountain Bell mar-
 keted two new IWM programs. To allow for the shift in demand that
 may have resulted from the introduction of these new forms of IWM,
 we use the treatment variable POST86.7
 In addition to billing and telemarketing records, we have used com-
 pany records to determine the frequency of line trouble for differing
 service zones in the metropolitan Boulder/Denver area. Mountain
 Bell maintains "trouble tickets," which are records of individual trou-
 ble calls serviced by the company. The trouble tickets contain the
 nature of the trouble and the phone number for the lines that were
 serviced. We used some 350,000 trouble tickets for Colorado residen-
 tial and business customers to estimate the probability of inside-wire
 trouble in various regions of Colorado. Trouble probabilities
 (TPROB) were assigned to individual customer records on the basis
 of the prefix of the individual's phone number.8
 In table 1 we present variable definitions and sample statistics. As
 can be seen from the table, 57 percent of households subscribe to
 IWM. Nearly 70 percent of households acquired service after 1986,
 which reflects the high degree of turnover in the residential popula-
 tion. Households averaged about $20,000 in annual income and had
 typical monthly phone bills of about $25. Monthly trouble probabili-
 ties ranged from .00318 to .00742. The differences in zonal trouble
 probabilities reflect differences in the vintage of the underlying hous-
 ing stock and differences in the vintage of phone equipment.
 7For further discussion, see Cicchetti and Dubin (1992).
 8 We determined TPROB by finding the average number of monthly trouble occur-
 rences by zone (in eight zones and a residual zone) for the years 1982-86 and then
 dividing by the average number of customers in the corresponding region who were
 covered under the company's IWM program.
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 VI. Estimation
 We now examine the consistency of the observed choices of inside-
 wire maintenance with expected utility theory. We also compare the
 reduced-form and structural-form methods for estimating the indi-
 vidual's utility function.
 A. Reduced-Form Estimation
 Estimation of the probabilistic choice model given by equation (4)
 requires either a direct specification of the function AV or an approxi-
 mation of this function. This section takes the latter approach. Since
 AV = f(W, p) = [U(W - R) - U(W)] - p[U(W- C) -U(W)],
 a second-order Taylor series expansion of AV in wealth and the prob-
 ability of trouble is given by
 f(W, p) f(Wo, po) + fw(W - WO) + fp(p - po) + 1/2fWW(W - WO)2
 - Wo)(p - po) + i/2fp(p - po)2.
 The reduced-form estimation method uses the linear and quadratic
 terms in W and p as explanatory variables in a binary logit model for
 choice of IWM service. A negative value for fw indicates that insur-
 ance is inferior and has implications for the properties of the underly-
 ing utility function as discussed above. A positive estimate offp shows
 that the utility is increasing in wealth. A negative value of fwp reveals
 concavity in the utility function. Similarly, the signs and magnitudes
 of the coefficients on the second-order terms provide additional in-
 formation about the shape of the utility function.
 In table 2 we present the reduced-form logit models. In each model
 we include an alternative specific construct and a dummy variable for
 those households that acquired telephone service after 1986. These
 two terms are entered to allow for state dependence in the utility
 structure; that is, they represent shifts in tastes and preferences that
 may be attributable to the insured versus uninsured states. In all cases
 the POST86 variable has a positive and significant coefficient, which
 affirms the hypothesis that consumers found the IWM insurance
 plans collectively more valuable after 1986.
 Models 1 and 2 are estimated as baseline cases and do not include
 the income and probability covariates. In model 3 we include income,
 the trouble probability, and the size of the monthly telephone bill.
 Our hypothesis is that consumers with higher average bills require
 more reliable service and are willing to pay a premium to insure
 reliability. The coefficient of BILL is significant and positive in the
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 various models. This is consistent with our hypothesis that BILL pro-
 vides a measure of the importance of service reliability to consumers.9
 The coefficient of income in model 3 shows that discrete insurance
 purchases are inferior. As income rises, the probability that an indi-
 vidual will self-insure increases. The sign of the trouble probability
 variable in model 3 is also consistent with the theory. An increase in
 the trouble probability increases the demand for IWM and reduces
 the probability of self-insurance. Model 4 is a simple reprise of model
 3 using only the first-order terms from the Taylor series expansion.
 Note that centering the income and probability terms around their
 mean values shifts the estimated intercept coefficient. Finally, model
 5 adds the second-order terms to model 4. Here again the coefficients
 on the linear income and probability terms are consistent with the
 theory. The coefficient on the squared probability term is not signifi-
 cant from zero at conventional levels (also consistent with the predic-
 tions of expected utility theory).'0 The cross-partial term has the cor-
 rect sign for a population of risk-averse individuals, but the estimated
 coefficient is not significant at conventional levels. Finally, the squared
 income term is positive and significant, which indicates that the pro-
 pensity to self-insure is increasing at a decreasing rate.11
 The estimated coefficients from the reduced-form estimation can
 also be used to estimate the parameters from a specified parametric
 utility function (Cicchetti and Dubin 1992). But given the lack of
 precision attached to some of the estimates in table 2, the mapping
 of reduced-form to structural-form estimates should not be preferred
 to direct structural estimation.
 B. Structural-Form Estimation
 We now consider the structural estimation of a utility function consis-
 tent with the revealed preferences of individuals who made choices
 9 The referee has suggested two alternative hypotheses to explain the effects of BILL
 on the consumer's IWM decision. First, consumers with larger values of BILL will find
 the monthly charge for IWM relatively less expensive and might therefore be more
 likely to purchase the insurance. The high degree of correlation between BILL and
 its reciprocal does not make it possible to distinguish these two hypotheses. Second,
 insofar as customers with higher values of BILL are likely to incur greater costs from
 the loss of service or the time spent searching for a repair service, they face "worse"
 self-insurance gambles. Machina's (1982) "fanning-out" hypothesis predicts that these
 customers should act as though they were more risk preferring. Since the reduced-
 form estimates show that consumers with larger values of BILL prefer the insurance,
 it is possible to interpret our results as a rejection of the fanning-out theory.
 10 The referee has noted that the marginal significance of the squared term for
 TPROB reveals some nonlinear weighting of the probabilities. This result, if credited,
 provides empirical support for both prospect and rank-dependent preference theories.
 11 Viscusi and Evans (1990) found all their second-order Taylor series terms to be
 insignificant.
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 regarding IWM service. The class of utility functions we adopt allows
 risk aversion to vary among individuals with the same level of income
 and to vary with the level of income for otherwise identical individu-
 als. We specify utility to be a member of the hyperbolic absolute risk
 aversion (HARA) class with'2
 U(W) = a I * (W + a2)L. (7)
 This utility class contains several well-known utility functions as spe-
 cial cases including linear, quadratic, negative exponential, power,
 and log. The degree of absolute risk aversion for the utility function
 in equation (7) is
 Ra(W) =1 -L
 W + a2'
 which is declining in both W and L. Monotonicity and concavity re-
 quire that 0 < L < 1.
 The arguments to the binary logit function for the choice probabil-
 ity are AV and the state-dependent variables: the constant and
 POST86. To allow the level of risk aversion to vary across individuals,
 we take the parameter L to be a linear function in the monthly bill: 13
 L = bl + b2 *BILL. (8)
 This choice is consonant with our reduced-form analysis, where we
 found that customers with larger bills were more likely to purchase
 IWM contracts. We therefore expect the coefficient b2 to be negative,
 which implies that as BILL increases the degree of risk aversion in-
 creases. Since the willingness to pay will increase with the level of
 absolute risk aversion, AV = U(W - R) - U(W - R*) will increase,
 making it more likely that insurance will be purchased.
 Since overweighting effects may be present, we embed the observed
 probability within a transformation that allows individuals to consis-
 tently under- or overestimate the true trouble probability. We specify
 the log-odds ratio for the subjective probability of line trouble to
 be a linear function of the log-odds ratio of the true line trouble
 probability:
 log(1 ) = c1 + c2 Iog( TPROB). (9)
 This is equivalent to specifying a logit probability for p as a function
 of a constant term and the log-odds of TPROB. The specification in
 12 See, e.g., Merton (1971) for a discussion of the HARA class.
 13 Viscusi and Evans explore heterogeneity in their estimation by taking key parame-
 ters to be linear functions of individual characteristics. The characteristic data were
 not significant (at the 5 percent level) in their estimation.
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 TABLE 3
 STRUCTURAL LOGIT MODELS (N = 10,644)
 Dependent Variable: IWM
 Coefficient Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
 al 1,935.1 1,935.1 1,949.4
 (18.23) (18.24) (18.22)
 a2 .6849 .6456 .6475
 (3.632) (4.283) (4.253)
 b 1 3.491 3.498 3.497
 (21.33) (20.98) (14.75)
 b2 -.121 -.123 -.124
 (-12.62) (-13.63) (-12.89)
 c I .0 .0 - .0021
 constrained constrained (- .0012)
 c2 1.0 1.0093 1.0096
 constrained (72.41) (2.71)
 dl -.054 -.050 -.054
 (-1.17) (-1.06) (-1.12)
 d2 .992 .992 .988
 (22.66) (22.65) (22.57)
 Log likelihood - 6,791.1 - 6,790.9 -6,790.9
 NOTE.-I = purchase insurance (57.1 percent); 0 = self-insure (42.9 percent). t-statistics are in parentheses.
 equation (9) allows the subjective probability to be constant (c2 = 0),
 equal to the actual probability (c 1 = 0, c2 = 1), or consistently biased,
 with measurement of the bias reflected in the coefficient values for
 cI and c2. The model we estimate by FIML is then
 Q individual i purchases IWM
 _ 1 (10)
 1 + e- (d 1 + d2 * POST86 +A Vi)-
 In all, eight parameters are estimated: a 1 and a2, which character-
 ize the utility function in equation (7); b I and b2, which characterize
 risk aversion in equation (8); c I and c2, which characterize subjective
 probability in equation (9); and d 1 and d2, which characterize state-
 dependent effects in equation (10).
 The results of the estimation are presented in table 3. The models
 we present vary depending on whether the subjective probability is
 constrained or not constrained in its relationship to the actual proba-
 bility. The results are similar across the specifications. In model 3,
 for example, the parameters of the utility function a 1 and a2 are both
 significant. The sign of a 1 shows that the probability of purchasing
 insurance increases with AV as expected.'4 The significance of the
 14 The parameter a 1 is not determined independently of the scale of the logit model.
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 term a2 rejects the power utility function in favor of the more general
 HARA class.
 The estimated values for the parameters c 1 and c2 reveal that con-
 sumers use a subjective probability that is nearly identical to the actual
 probability: c 1 is not statistically different from zero and c2 is signifi-
 cant but not significantly different from one. Thus there is slight
 evidence that consumers overestimate the small trouble probability
 event, but not to any significant degree.'5 The estimates of the coeffi-
 cients d 1 and d2 are similar to those we obtained in the reduced-form
 estimation for the alternate specific constant and the POST86 dummy
 variable. The only difference is that the intercept is not significant
 from zero in the structural estimates.
 The coefficients bl and b2 for the risk parameter L(bl, b2) are
 each significant, and b2 has the hypothesized negative sign. Predicting
 the risk aversion parameter L for each sample observation, we find
 that L is positive in about 78 percent of all households (consistent
 with expected utility theory) but negative in the remaining 22 percent
 (inconsistent with expected utility theory). The parameter L has an
 average value of 0.37 with a minimum of - 8.86, a maximum of 2.87,
 and a standard deviation of 1.28. In about 41 percent of the cases, L
 lies in the unit interval. In these cases individuals experience declin-
 ing absolute risk aversion. With only 22 percent of the cases having
 point predictions that are nonpositive, the overall pattern of results
 is remarkably consistent with expected utility theory.
 The average individual (with monthly income of $1,699.40 and an
 L value of 0.37) has a relatively small degree of absolute risk aversion
 and would be willing to pay only $0.264 per month to avoid the
 inside-wire trouble. That 57 percent of households in the sample
 subscribe to the IWM program can be explained in part by the change
 in demand that resulted from the marketing efforts of Mountain Bell
 after 1986 and the general preference for the status quo and for
 priority service present in the 1980s.
 VII. Conclusions
 Day and Fox (1985, p. 83) hypothesized that "relatively affluent per-
 sons, especially those who also are well educated, are less likely to
 perceive real value in appliance service contracts, because these per-
 sons generally tend to be less risk-averse, i.e., more likely to self-
 15 A model that imposes a form of non-expected utility theory wherein c2 is con-
 strained to be zero produced a smaller log likelihood (- 6,792.4). The estimated subjec-
 tive probability in this case was .00678 (t-statistic = 44.4). This suggests that consumers
 overestimate the mean probability to a degree that is small in absolute terms but large
 in percentage terms.
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 insure, than consumers on restricted budgets." Our estimation has
 confirmed the presence of risk aversion and has also revealed that
 IWM purchases are for the most part inferior.
 The results we have obtained are also very encouraging for ex-
 pected utility theory. The coefficients determined in the structural
 estimation were significant and in accord with our expectations. For
 most consumers, increases in income led to increases in the likelihood
 that self-insurance was selected. On the other hand, consumers who
 had higher phone usage were less likely to self-insure.
 The structural models provided significant improvement in overall
 fit as compared with the reduced-form models, as evidenced by the
 significant improvement in the log likelihoods at convergence (note
 that model 5 of table 2 and model 3 of table 3 have the same degrees
 of freedom). Moreover, the structural logit model correctly predicts
 the choices of about 65 percent of the cases, which is significant since
 the frequency of observed selection was only 57 percent choosing
 IWM versus 43 percent not doing so.
 The HARA utility class was found to perform better than other
 common choices such as log and negative exponential in the sense
 that imposing these functional forms led to either problems with non-
 convergence or models that converged to implausible values (such
 as everywhere nonmonotonic utility). This may explain some of the
 difficulty encountered by Viscusi and Evans (1990). Using log utility,
 they were able to solve for the exact risk premium in closed form.
 Their estimation was accomplished using nonlinear least squares. For
 other forms of the utility function, Viscusi and Evans were not able
 to solve directly for the risk premium and were therefore unable to
 estimate their model by nonlinear least squares. Their attempts at
 FIML methods were nonconvergent.
 Finally, our estimation sample does not reflect the greater partici-
 pation levels for IWM that prevailed in the 1980s. In order to gauge
 the willingness to pay of individuals to avoid telephone line trouble,
 we have made an adjustment to the alternative specific constant in
 the structural logit model to reflect a 70 percent market penetration.
 In the 1980s, the median individual was willing to pay about $0.55
 per month to avoid inside-wire trouble.
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